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PRESENTATION TO US WORKING GROUP ON UNITARY TAXATION • 
• 
1. The application of the Unitary system of taxation by a number 
of US states has _become a matter of grea~ urgency since the 
supreme Court decision in the Container Corporation.of America 
v Franchise Tax Board case. 
Under the unitary system of taxation subsidiaries of multi-
national enterprises are taxed, in the US states concerned, 
not on their profits in the state as ascertained by separate or 
arms length accounting but rather on a proportion of world 
profits earned by the group of which it forms a part. That 
proportion is determined using a three factor formula which 
applies sales, payroll and fixed asset figures in the taxing 
jurisdiction to the corresponding world wide figures. 
There is a real danger that other US-states not at present 
applying the unitary system will feel encouraged to do so 
following the court decision which upheld the Californian 
System as applied to US based multi-national companies. 
2. The President of the United States has now established a high 
level Working group under the Chairmanship of Treasury Secretary 
Regan to explore and attempt to resolve the issues involved in 
the application of the Unitary method. These include the 
application of unitary tax in an international context including 
its impact on international investment flows and an equitable 
resolution to the problems of foreign governments and foreign 
based multinationals. The purpose of this paper is to establish 
the considerations we deem relevant for the tr~ding partners 
of the U.S. and in particular for the EC. 
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, 3. It is an cttcepted principle of international taxation that an 
enterprise of a state which carries on business in another state 
through a permanent establishment or a subsidiary may only_ be 
taxed in that other State on profits of activities carried on 
in that other state. 
4 •. The OECD Model Double Taxation Convention of 1977, to which the 
United States subscribed makes it plain at Article 7(2) that a 
permanent establishment of a foreign enterprise shall be 
attributed the profits it might be expected to make if.it were 
a 9!2t!n£t_2ng_~~E2;2t~-~nt~;E;!2~ and may be taxed on those 
profits. 
S. The Commentary to Article 7 paragraph 4 of the OECD Convention 
states: "It has in some cases been the practice to determine 
the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment not on 
the basis of separate accounts or by making an estimate of arm's 
length profit, but simply by apportioning the total profits of 
the enterprise by reference to.various formulae. Such a method 
differs from those envisaged in paragraph 2, since it contemplates 
not an attribution of profits on a separate enterprise footing, 
but an apportionment of total profits: and indeed it might produce 
a result in figures which would differ from that which would be 
arrived at by a compu'tation based on separate accounts" • 
. 
resulting from activity carried out in the state, are the ultimate 
yardstick of the taxation rights of that state. 
6. With regard to profit determination ~nan indirect basis using 
an allocation method based on an apportionment of total profits, 
this method is not regarded as appropriate and should be used 
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exceptionally and only if it is accepted both by the taxation 
authorities and taxpayers generally as being satisfactory. 
7. The United St~tes went even a step further when they expressed 
with reference ·to Article 7(2) of .the treaty the belief that it 
would be appropriate "to provide for arm's length treatment not 
only with the head office of the enterprise, but also with.any 
person controlling, controlled by, or subject to the same common 
control as the enterprise". They also·expressed the more 
definite view that profits should be determined on an independent 
enterprise basis rather than a separate enterprise basis. (OECO 
Model Conunentary on Article 7 Paragraph 24 and 40). 
8. This attribution of taxation rights exists for permanent establishment1 
which means integral parts of.an enterprise and it goes without 
saying that this attribution must apply with even greater force 
if an enterprise carries out its activities in~ state by means 
of separate legal entity, that is a subsidiary. 
9. The OECD Model Convention including its conunentary has been 
adopted by the Council of the OECD which means that this is the 
basis for __ the worldwide system of double tax convention including 
those to which the USA is a party. Since it is a model convention 
an~ despite the fact that it does not directly create written tax 
law, it nevertheless follows that its guidelines form an integral 
part of long established international taxation practice. It 
cannot be unilaterally ignored for internal political reasons by 
- . 
one party without serious consequences to the whole equilibrium 
of international tax principles as a basis for international trade 
and conunerce • 
. 10. Furthermore, the report of the OECD Conunittee on Fiscal Matters, 
on Transfer Pricing and Multinational·Ente~prises (1979), firmly 
endorses the arms-length principle, and rejects alternative 
principles as being incompatible with articles 7 and 9 of the OECD 
Model Taxation Convention as being unnecessarily arbitrary. 
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11. The U.S. has contributed to this international tax consensus: 
. . 
a ·furtlier-'·extension of global methods threatens ·,to ~disrupt· .. this,. 
·emei:gin~i order or consensus. - . ... ' : ,• '. ·. . -. . ·.:." '· .. 
.. ' 
, '.,.-
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12. The attribution of taxation rights described above exist for good 
reasons and specific criticism of the unitary system by the 
international business and ~rading comI'l)unity centres on the 
inequitable and unfair consequences of the application of this 
particular system. 
!h~;~_!!L-~~£~22~;!!i_!nh~;~n~_!n_~h~_2i2~~~L-~-2~;2ns_;!2~-2~-~2~e!~ 
. taxation. 
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13. It is obvious that the results of the indirect method applied to 
w~rldwide profits may lead to an excessive attribution of pro!its 
to a US state. 
14. This might in particular be the case where the indirect formula 
itself, by reason of its composition causes an imbalance in the 
attribution in favour of the state concerned. 
15. yayroll and property values .in the US are high compared to other 
countries and it is most unlikely that corresponding values 
elsewhere in the world would reach the level of, for example, 
Californian values and the result must be that formula 
apportionment has an inbuilt tendency to allocate higher profits 
to the us jurisdiction that could be justified as reasonably 
allocable under the direct method. 
16. Formula apportionment makes no allowance for differing circumstances 
-- -- . --· . 
likely to be found throughout the world in the operations of a 
large multinational company • 
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17. For example, in a high cost jurisdiction such as California 
payroll costs will be high and state personal income tax receipts 
will be correspondingly high but profit on an arms' length basis 
may well be low~r than in low cost. countries. 
a 
18. In a low cost country on the other hand profits may be higher 
both in relation to sales and costs. Personal income tax receipts 
by the government will be lower but tax on profits will be. 
correspondingly higher. 
19. Under formula apportionment a Californian subsidiary of' a wprldwide 
enterprise will be allocated much higher profits than it would have 
returned on an arms' length basis. This apportionment ignores the 
fact that California will already have received substantial revenue 
in the form of personal income tax while a high proportion of the 
profits calculated on worldwide apportionment basis will already 
have been taxed elsewhere. 
20. Profits in developing countries may well be muc~ higher in relation 
to costs than in more highly developed countr.ies, with the higher 
return compensating in some measure for the higher risks of 
expropriation, currency exchange limitation and similar factors. 
It is unfair that a state operating a worldwide reporting system 
should wish to deprive a parent company outside the US of a fair 
.. ·- ... _._ 
return on what is a high risk capital investment. 
21. Treasury Assistant Secretary Lubiok who appeared before the House 
of Representatives Ways and Means Committee on 31 March 1980 was 
reported as pointing out that the unitary system appears, in 
comparison to an arms' length or separate accounting method, to 
generate substantially more taxation for.the states. 
22. At the same hearing a striking example of the distortive effect 
of the system was given regarding the Hongkon~ Bank of California 
which had its net income before tax in 1977 adjusted from $707,000 
to $4,832,000 and assessed a 79% effective rate of tax inst~ad of 
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the (then) statutory rate of 11.61. 
# 
23. It follows that in those situations described enterprises will 
have sometimes to suffer serious double taxation to the extent 
. . . . . 
that the indirect formula in comparison with the direct leads to 
higher taxation in-the us. In such a situation what is effectively 
happening is that part of the non-American portion of worldwide 
profits is being taxed in the US - the full amount of, .these non-: 
American profits are of course al;eady taxed in the home country 
of the enterprise (or_in whatever other country the profits are 
earned). This double taxation is due to the fact that the US tax 
--------------------------------------------L-----------£!2!m_!2_~n!!~t~;~!!Y-~~t~ng~g_!2_E;2!!!§_2!!;!E~t~E1~_!2_!_!2;~!gn 
!2~-1~;!29!£!!2n· 
24. The consequences of the application of the unitary system described 
above would be even more anomalous in a situation where in 
accordance with the direct method there would be no profit at all 
attributable to the US activity whereas the worldwide activities 
of the enterpr:i,:se have made a pro.fit. 
This situation might in particular arise where an enterprise has 
start _up losses in the US. ~n this respect what should be borne in 
mind is that whereas US firms have ~een firmly established in 
Europe for many years, many.European enterprises have only recently, 
been entering the US markets. 
25. An example of·this situation was also given to the House Ways and 
Means Committee at the hearing in 1980: 
Scallop Nuclear Inc a subsidiary of Shell Petroleum NV had reported 
losses for federal income tax purposes of $390 million in the 
years 1973-76. The California Franchise Tax Bpard was reported 
as having announced that Scallop Nuclear's proportion of worldwide 
comb~ned income of the Shell group·for those years was $40 million 
a co~plete turnaround from the federal position. 
• 
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26. Foreign enterprises trading _in US States not imposing unitary 
taxation incur in common with US enterp~ises in a similar situation 
certain costs in complying with federa~ and state requirements. If 
the US enterprise has subsidiaries ope~ating outside the US financial 
returns will be required for company accounting purposes in US 
currency. The non-domestic corporation will have no requirement 
to produce any returns, other than those concerning its US operations, 
in US currency. 
27. If the foreign enterprise however operates in a state jurisdiction 
where worldwide combined reporting requirements exist it will have 
the additional burden of reporting_on its income and on the details 
of its operations throughout the world. This can be a mas~ive 
task as can be seen when one considers the ramifications of a 
multinational company such as Shell Petroleum NV, a Dutch ~ompany, 
which has some 900 non-US subsidiaries and affiliates operating 
in over 100 countries. 
28. In addition, all financial returns which will h~_ve been expressed 
in ·foreign currencies and forei~n languages will have to be 
translated into US currency and English and the income figures 
adjusted to agree with the rules in operation in the state to 
which the return is being made. State rules are by no means 
uniform and a ser~es of adjustments might well be required if 
operations are carried on throughout t~e us. There is no doubt 
that an exceedingly laborious and costly task is imposed on 
foreign corporations. 
29. Large quantities of non-financial date concerning the operation 
and organisation of foreign busin~sses may al$O be required in 
connection with the determination of whether or not a business is 
unitary. This can also be an extremely onerous task for a large 
corporation; 
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International Trade and Commerce 
-------~------------------------
30 •. The unilateral extension by the States using the unitary tax system 
. . . . 
to the detriment of foreign jurisdictions and its grave consequences 
.. -
. fqr rion-·American enterprises active in the us is a serious impediment 
. ~ . . . . . ' . ' . . . 
. to'the·operation of a coherent.and consistent framework £or the 
carrying out of international trade and investment as has been 
underlined by Member States of the Eur~pean Community·on a number 
· of occasions • 
. 31_. Such a framework has been provided by the network of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties and nine of the ten Member 
States of the European Community have entered into post-war 
treaties with the United States to establish reciprocal protection 
for commercial relationships. 
Each of these treaties contains a specific provision similar to 
. that in the Netherlands/US Treaty of Article XI(4) which prohibits 
the imposition or application of "any tax fee or charge upon any 
income capital or other basis in excess of that reasonably 
allocable or apportionable to its territories". 
The _extension of unitary tax and the grave consequences resulting 
from it for non American enterprises carries the risk of seriously 
disturbing international trade ~nd investment relationships. It 
will undermine the legal basis on which such· international 
relationships are built. It will replace the current well-
understood tax arrangements by a ·regime which will be u~certain 
in its effect, and distort and inhibit investment decisions.~ This-
could have consequences 
in other industrialized 
investment in the USA. 
for foreign investment of·~~ enterprises 
countries, as well as for foreign internal 
' 
32. What is ·even more potentially harmful is the ~verse effects on 
world wide trade and investment if foreign governments responded by 
taking countermeasures ~r by introducing unitary systems of their own • 
. ,, 
- g~ ._ 
In particular the use pf unitary tax by some US states may 
provide for some developing countries a welcome argument for 
them to follow the American example and to increase by it ·their 
government's take from foreign firms •. In the long run this might 
~ . . . 
create not only for non-American industrialised countries but in 
part_icular f.or the· US even greater disadvantages than the. short-
term advantages of the unitary tax ·systems may have for some of 
the US states. 
33. Nine Member States of the EEC have concluded Treaties on Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation with the USA after 1945 (so-called FCN 
treaties). All these treaties contain clauses which specifically 
protect the companies of one treaty party with respect to their 
investments in the territories of the other treaty party. The 
unitary method of taxation seriously abridges such protection with 
respect to the investments_ which companies incorporated in the 
nine Member States concerned made within the USA. The Member States 
are therefore, of the opinion that the unitary method of taxation 
violates the terms of the FCN treaties in force between nine Member 
States and the USA. 
34. The trading partners of the US look to the working group now in 
session to take full account of the arguments deployed in this note 
concerning the damage that unitary taxation would cause to the 
international trading community, in whatever recommendations it 
may make. 
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